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REVIEWS
A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
Philip A. Trautman*
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS.

By Russell J. Weintraub.

Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1971. Pp. 494.
$13.50.
Professor Weintraub has produced a text which within a very short
time will take its place as a standard reference work along with those
of Cavers, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Goodrich and Scoles, Leflar, Stumberg, and von Mehren and Trautman. 1 While a considerable portion of
the book has previously appeared in print in various articles by the
author, much of it is new and all of it is updated and timely. Commentary is included upon most of the traditional areas of conflict of
laws, including jurisdiction, choice of law, constitutional limitations
on each of these, and the particular problems in federal courts. There
is no separate treatment of judgments, but some of the problems involved are discussed at appropriate places throughout the text. For
those not particularly conversant with conflicts terminology, the book
should prove to be readable and understandable. For those acquainted with the subject matter, the book should serve to stimulate
and challenge previously formulated premises and conclusions.
The subject of jurisdiction, which has not previously been treated
by Professor Weintraub in his writings, receives major discussion. The
constitutional framework of due process is first outlined, followed by a
detailed discussion of the bases for in personam, in rem and quasi in
rem jurisdiction, concluding with an analysis of Seider v. Roth2 and
*
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its accompanying problems. Several major themes of the jurisdiction
discussion deserve particular mention.
The relationship between jurisdiction and choice of law, both as
to constitutional limitations and practical implementation of relevant
policies, is pointed out throughout the text. This relationship is sometimes overlooked in the literature and it is desirable to recall it from
time to time. Likewise desirable is the author's emphasis that the interpretation of constitutional limitations upon jurisdiction is a continuing
process. It has changed in the past and will continue to do so in the
future. Thus, the present importance of physical nexus between a defendant and a state may in time give way to a general test of whether,
under all the circumstances, it is reasonable to exercise jurisdiction.
There is a particularly good examination of modern long-arm
statutes which provide for jurisdiction upon the commission of a tort.
Included are the problems which arise in deciding whether a statute
applies when the defendant has acted in the forum with resultant
harm there, or has acted outside the forum with harm therein, or has
only put a product in the stream of commerce. Concerning the last
two of these cases, forseeability of harm in the forum is stated to be
the key to satisfaction of the requirements of due process. When the
tort is a libel published in the forum, the question arises whether the
first amendment imposes requirements upon the exercise of jurisdiction additional to those of due process. The author suggests that restraint should be exercised in protecting the publisher from suit in
view of the plaintiffs interest in a convenient forum and the likelihood
that witnesses will be present in the forum and that forum law will
govern the substantive issue of libel. The protection of the publisher, it
is asserted, should derive not so much from jurisdictional limitations
as from constitutional protection of free speech. 3
Weintraub justifiably takes issue, as have others, with the use of
quasi in rem jurisdiction to determine claims against the defendant
which are unrelated to the property when there is an appropriate
forum reasonably available elsewhere for in personam jurisdiction.
Such practice should be declared a denial of due process, and until

3. See, e.g., New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, lnc.,403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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this is done it is urged that greater use be made of the doctrine of
4
forum non conveniens to dismiss such suits.
While the due process clause has been the chief constitutional limitation on state court jurisdiction, the point is made that the commerce
clause can serve as a useful addition to due process concepts. The national interest in avoiding unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce may serve as the limiting factor in those instances where the
exercise of jurisdiction comes close to the due process line. And with
the trend toward the enactment and liberal interpretation of long-arm
statutes, the limits of due process may be approached more often in
the future.
The jurisdiction chapter provides the reader with an excellent overview of the subject and an analysis of many of the present critical
problems. The book also contains a full but concise treatment of the
principal problems relating to marriage, divorce and custody, including an analysis of principles of jurisdiction, choice of law, and
recognition of judgment pertaining to each topic. An illustration of
each is useful.
Regarding jurisdiction, a persuasive argument is presented for the
adoption of long-arm provisions to enable the marital domicile to exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary husband for the purpose of
making an alimony and support decree for the benefit of his wife and
children. Likewise, it is urged that a state that has a reasonable basis
for in personam jurisdiction over an absent spouse and parent should
have a long-arm statute which provides for jurisdiction in custody
proceedings. An appropriate long-arm provision at the marital domicile would presumably have such a reasonable basis.
As to choice of law, the author points out that the usual result has
been that the state which is the marital domicile will hold a marriage
valid if valid under the law of the state where it was celebrated, even
though the marriage would have been invalid if celebrated at the
domicile. This result may be desirable, but a better explanation might
be based upon dissatisfaction with the domicile's invalidating statute

4. The author wisely counsels a general greater usage of forum non conveniens to
increase efficiency in the courts and fairness to the parties. But see Lansverk v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 54 Wn.2d 124, 338 P.2d 747 (1959), which rejects the doctrine.
See Trautman, Forum Non Conveniens in Washington---A Dead Issue?, 35 WASH. L.
REV. 88 (1960).

401

Washington Law Review

Vol. 47: 399, 1972

rather than a pretense at choice of law analysis. 5 Weintraub's reaction
6
to the situation is particularly appropriate:
If . . .courts continue, as they probably will, to use a pseudoconflicts analysis in order to avoid draconian marriage law, this
conduct is understandable. There is great temptation to elude the local
rule. We should recognize, however, that this sort of adjudication
bears about as much resemblance to the kind of state-interest analysis
that, in other areas, produces wise and just solutions to conflicts problems, as reading tea leaves.
In the area of judgments, custody decrees are subject to modification in all states upon changes in circumstances. This has resulted in
repeated litigation of custody awards. As a partial solution, Weintraub
offers the welcome suggestion that courts voluntarily refrain from
modifying a custody decree of another state when (1) that decree was
rendered by a court that had sufficient contacts with the parties to
reach an intelligent decision, (2) that other court still has these contacts so that it could make an informed determination of the request
for modification, and (3) there is no compelling reason, such as imminent threat of irreparable harm to the child, why the parties should
not be remitted to that other state for decision on the requested modification. This concept of self-restraint should be suggested to each
court presented with a modification petition.
A chapter of the book is devoted to the problems of choice of law
7
in federal courts. The development of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
is traced through the outcome-determinative test, Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Coop., Inc.,8 and Hanna v. Plumer.9 Particular treatment
is given to the Klaxon o principle that state choice of law rules govern
in federal diversity cases. Weintraub asserts that the validity of requiring federal courts to apply state conflicts rules turns upon a considera-

5. A state-interest analysis, the approach generally advocated in the book for the
resolution of choice of law problems, would perhaps suggest the invalidation of the marriage. Though much can be said for the application of the "better law," the better law
ought to be that of a state with a reasonable contact. Certainly, it should not be the law
of a state selected by the parties for the very purpose of avoiding the law of the only
state with a reasonable contact.
6. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 173 (1971).
7. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
9. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
10. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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tion of the policy against intrastate forum-shopping as compared with
certain "countervailing considerations." He concludes that the following are examples of situations in which countervailing considerations predominate and in which, when jurisdiction in personam is
available in a federal court and not available in a state court in the
state where the federal court is sitting, a federal district court should
not be required to follow state conflicts rules: cases under the Federal
Interpleader Act, and cases in which a party utilizes federal process
beyond the boundaries of the forum state under Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Another principal topic of the text is the constitutional limitations
on choice of law. Emphasis is placed upon due process and full faith
and credit considerations. As in other areas, the limitation of due
process on choice of law is that of reasonableness under the circumstances. The full faith and credit clause is seen as adding the limitation
that even though a state may have a reasonable contact so as to
permit the application of its domestic law without violating due process, the interest of that state must be weighed against the need for national uniformity of result under a public act, record or judicial proceeding of a sister state. The same full faith and credit standard that
applies to judicial proceedings of sister states is said to apply to public
acts of sister states, though the application of that standard may produce different results in the case of recognition of judgments than it
does with statutes.
The author traces the United States Supreme Court opinions from
those imposing somewhat strict limitations on the states' power to determine their choice of law rules to the more recent opinions allowing
for much freedom by the states. This constitutional development has
permitted the states to move from territorial choice of law rules to
"functional" and "state-interest" approaches to choice of law.
The principal contribution of the book is its statement and argument for a functional method of choice of law analysis, as contrasted
with the traditional, territorially-oriented approach. The point is well
made that under the orthodox approach much time has been spent
seeking to give meaning to such terms as "substance," "procedure,"
"domicile," "place of wrong," "place of contract," and the like,
without keeping in mind the purpose of determining such meaning.
An approach concerned with identifying which states have contacts
with the parties and the transaction, the policies behind each state's
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rules, and the likelihood that each state's policies would be advanced
by the application of its domestic law is more likely to lead to the
right results than an approach which attempts to determine what is
substance and what is the domocile. As time passes and decisions are
rendered under a functional approach, rules will develop as guidelines
and thus ad hoc decisions will be avoided. It is, of course, important
that no law be chosen as governing until the content of that law is
known and the policies it represents are evaluated. This in turn requires that the methods of notice and proof of foreign law be flexible
and easy of application. Otherwise, there may be a tendency to apply
forum law because it is known, or there may be an application or
non-application of foreign law when its full content and policies are
not known. The full meaning and implications of Weintraub's functional analysis are developed in conjunction with the treatment of particular subjects, such as torts, contracts and property.
Weintraub discusses in considerable detail what he labels "a
method for resolving torts conflicts problems." First, there should be
the identification and elimination of spurious or false conflicts. To do
this it is necessary to determine the purposes or policies behind the
rules of the states having some contact with the parties or the occurrence. If only one state has policies that would be advanced by
applying its internal law, there is a false conflict and the law of that
state should be applied. It is essential that the process of identifying
policies not be one of attempting to dream up policies, but rather
the usual process of lawyers of examining the relevant legislative history of any statutes, the cases articulating policies in domestic situations, and the legal journals in which the rules in question are discussed. "
If an evaluation of the policies behind the laws of the interested
states establishes a true conflict, further analysis is necessary. Then to
be considered are the general direction or trend in the area of law
involved, possible unfair surprise to the defendant, and the choice of
law rule in the foreign state. Weintraub summarizes as follows: "An
actor is liable for his conduct if he is liable under the law of any state
11. The avoidance of speculation as to policies is difficult. As an example of an instance in which the author may have engaged in such speculation, reference might be
made to a discussion in which the statement is made that "Texas might be regarded as
having a [particular] policy" with no indication of the basis for identifying the particular policy. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, at 238 n.45.
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whose interests would be advanced significantly by imposing liability,
12
unless imposition of liability would unfairly surprise the actor.'
Some points must be particularly stressed with respect to an interest-analysis approach. First, an ad hoe procedure is not intended
nor anticipated, since cases will presumably fall into patterns over a
period of time. Second, though interest analysis involves a consideration of the particular issue involved, it is important to keep in mind
possible interrelationships between different rules in the same state or
shared purposes of what appear to be different rules in the interested
states. Third, an interest-analysis approach is not one of counting contacts nor is it one of "weighing" the interests of various states.
In the contracts chapter, Weintraub identifies and criticizes the diverse choice of law rules which have been applied to determine the
validity of contracts. The controlling factors have variously been:
place of making, place of performance, law intended or chosen by the
parties, state with the most significant relationship, and law of the
forum. In their stead, he advocates an approach isimiliar to that in
torts, namely, determining the policies that underlie domestic rules
relating to the validity of contracts, appraising the relevance of those
policies to the contacts that the parties or transaction have with the
states, and thereby identifying false conflicts. In the event of a true
conflict, where one state would legitimately validate the contract but
another would invalidate it, several factors are suggested for consideration. These include a rebuttable presumption of validity, determination of the general trends in the law of contracts, consideration of
whether the difference between the validating and the invalidating
rule is one of detail or basic policy, possible unfair surprise to one of
the parties in applying one of the state's domestic law, whether the
contract is "commercial" or "non-commercial," and an analysis of
the foreign state's choice of law rule and its purpose. Though such an
approach may lack the merit of certainty and predictability of result,
one may question whether there actually has been such certainty in
the past with the multiplicity of rules that has existed and whether the
courts perhaps have been engaged in a state-interest analysis without
saying so. The advantages of Weintraub's approach are that it is an
honest recognition of the problems presented in the contracts-conflicts

12.

Id. at 209.
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area and that it encourages counsel and the courts to state the factors
which actually affect their decisions. Hopefully, such an approach will
eventually lead to greater predictability as patterns of analysis develop.
In arguing for interest analysis in the areas of torts and contracts,
Weintraub has the support of a considerable number of courts. He
departs from most of the present authority in convincingly advocating
a similiar approach for property questions, even to the extent of overturning the situs rule which presently controls as to real property or
"immovables." While such an approach may often lead to the eventual application of the domestic law of the situs, it at least allows for
the possibility of some other domestic law should an examination of
the interests and policies of the interested states and the trends and
developments in the particular substantive area so indicate.
The discussion of choice of law problems concerning personal
property is divided between gift transactions and commercial transactions. While the orthodox rules governing choice of law in gift transactions have looked to the situs or domicile, Weintraub notes some
willingness by the courts in more recent cases to inquire into the policies of interested states. In accordance with the distinction typically
drawn in commercial transactions cases, the discussion includes an
analysis of problems arising between the secured creditor and his
debtor and between the secured creditor and third parties. There is a
further breakdown between choice of law principles in cases decided
prior to the Uniform Commercial Code and the principles included
therein. The discussion and criticism of the conflicts rules in the Code
are the most inclusive and penetrating of any in the standard conflicts
texts and should prove extremely helpful to counsel and students
alike, particularly during the immediate period while we await further
court decisions applying and clarifying the Code.
Weintraub's treatment of the concept of domicile is consistent with
his general thesis of proper conflicts analysis. The importance of domicile is discussed both for jurisdictional purposes and as a contact
under orthodox, territorially-oriented choice of law rules. Instead of
using domicile as a word evidencing contact and varying its meaning
for different purposes, as for example to determine intestate succession to movables or the validity of a will disposing of movables or the
capacity of a wife to sue her husband for negligence, Weintraub advocates a more direct and honest analysis of the policies underlying the
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domestic rules of the interested states. The appropriate domestic law
then can be applied without the necessity of characterizing any of the
states as the domicile. In short, just as the "place of the wrong" rule
in the tort-conflicts area is being abandoned, so likewise might the
rules referring to domicile.
Weintraub's attack upon the orthodoxy of conflicts thinking and his
argument for an interest-analysis approach is thorough and persuasive. The book ably describes what has happened and is happening
in conflicts, and, more importantly, leads the way for what will
happen in the future.
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